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The tortuous process of Brexit is complete. The UK has left the EU, and Boris
Johnson and the Conservative party now enjoy a commanding majority in the House
of Commons after several years of unstable minority governments. However, the
aftershocks of the last few years of legal and political turmoil rumble on, amplified to
some degree by the Covid crisis. At the international level, the EU/UK relationship
remains tense, as demonstrated by recent disagreements about vaccine exports and
the Northern Ireland Protocol. But turbulence is also being experienced at national
level. Brexit has opened up a number of constitutional fault-lines, which have not
closed with UK departure from the EU: indeed, if anything, they have continued to
widen. This has accelerated a process that had started even before the ‘Leave’ vote
in the June 2016 referendum – namely the ‘unsettling’ (to borrow a phrase from Neil
Walker) of the once famously stable British constitutional order.
Constitutional Unsettlement – The Devolution
Dimension
To start with, Brexit and the political controversy surrounding the Northern
Ireland Protocol has destabilised the delicate political balance in Northern Ireland
established by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 – as evidenced by the recent
outbreak of serious rioting in Belfast. New tension has been injected into the
already strained relationship between the central UK government and the devolved
administrations in Scotland and Wales. The UK Internal Market Act 2021, post-
Brexit legislation which repatriated powers previously held by the EU institutions
in Brussels, has given UK government ministers new authority to regulate matters
previously falling solely within devolved competence. The UK government has also
become more assertive in challenging the competency of the devolved legislatures
to pass legislation in sensitive policy areas. For example, it has just initiated a legal
challenge against provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Incorporation) (Scotland) Bill, which incorporates the rights protected into the
UN Convention into Scottish law. In response, the Scottish and Welsh Governments
have accused the UK government of attempting to undermine the existing devolution
framework, and clawing back power to Westminster.
Meanwhile, the Scottish National Party is on course to win the Scottish devolved
elections taking place in May 2021, which will increase pressure for a second
referendum on Scottish independence. With opinion polls showing strong levels
of support post-Brexit for independence, in particular among younger voters, the
UK government has started trying to promote the case for British unity – by, for
example, requiring public buildings to fly the national flag. This has also generated
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some vague discussion about turning the UK into a federal state. However, the two
major protagonists in the Scottish independence debate – the Scottish National
Party and the UK government – have so far shown zero interest in such proposals.
It is unlikely that the UK government or the Westminster Parliament will agree to
a second independence referendum for the foreseeable future, no matter what
happens in the May Scottish elections: this means that the Scottish independence
issue is likely to remain a serious constitutional flashpoint for some time to come.
Constitutional Unsettlement – Breaching the Rules
of the Game?
Controversy also persists about the UK government’s general attitude to
constitutional norms. During the Brexit period, government ministers were criticised
for using populist rhetoric to attack the parliamentary majority who were resisting
the possibility of a ‘no deal’ Brexit. Senior Conservative politicians also attacked the
courts for their perceived legal ‘activism’ in the Brexit-related Miller cases, with some
calling for radical reform of the UK Supreme Court. Similar criticism of the courts
has persisted after Brexit, with a think tank closely affiliated with the Conservative
Party calling for a ‘reining in’ of judicial power. Government ministers, including the
Prime Minister himself, have also recently accused ‘lefty human rights lawyers’ of
attempting to ‘hamstring’ immigration legislation.
 In response, leading academic commentators have accused the UK government of
creating a ‘crisis of civility’, and of failing to respect ‘established constitutional mores’.
The government has also been accused of ‘testing the limits of elective dictatorship’,
undermining the rule of law, and sidelining Parliament for much of the Covid crisis
through its sweeping use of emergency powers. Government ministers have also
been criticised for disregarding the Ministerial Code of Conduct, undermining the
status of the independent Electoral Commission, and for creating a climate that
‘smells of corruption’ when it comes to Covid-related public procurement issues.
Recently published government proposals to limit the scope of judicial review
have been described by a leading public law expert as ‘constitutional gaslighting’.
Fears have been expressed that the UK government will use the conclusions of a
forthcoming review of the UK Human Rights Act (HRA) to dilute rights protection.
In response, the UK government has largely ignored or dismissed these concerns
– implicitly treating them as exaggerated political claims generated by left-liberal
opponents of its post-Brexit reform strategy.
Populism – Or, More Simply, Conservatism
Occasionally Cosplaying as Populism?
All this has inevitably resulted in accusations that the UK government is dabbling
in ‘populism’, as analysed and pathologized by constitutional scholars across the
world over the last few years. There are certainly some interesting comparisons
to be made in this regard, as, for example, discussed by Alison Young. But the
‘populist’ label may obscure more than it illuminates in the UK context. To start with,
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Boris Johnson’s immensely privileged ‘insider’ status makes him a poor fit as a
populist demagogue. Also, it is striking how the current UK government’s approach
to constitutional matters echo those of previous Conservative governments in the
1980s and 1990s – as shown, for example, by their attacks on over-reaching judges,
and resistance to devolution
In general, the UK government’s constitutional agenda does not fit the description
of an ‘anti-elitist’ populist project – despite its occasional rhetorical posturing to that
effect. Nor is it a radical Schmittian exercise in concentrating public power in an
all-powerful executive, as some have claimed: many Conservative ministers and
MPs retain libertarian political instincts. Instead, it is best understood as a post-
Brexit attempt to return to an older constitutional orthodoxy – namely the traditional
model of the ‘political constitution’, which formed the core of the British constitutional
system for much of the 20th century
This traditional model centralised power in the sovereign UK Parliament and,
by extension, in UK governments who commanded a stable working majority in
the House of Commons. Westminster served as the dominant locus of political
activity, and the focus of democratic life. For defenders of this traditional model,
this prevented power being dispersed and diffused across different layers of
constitutional governance. It also established a direct relationship between the
people and the politicians, while minimising the powers of unelected authorities
such as judges, EU Commissioners, ‘fourth branch’ bodies such as electoral
commissions, and so on. Constitutional reforms such as the establishment of
devolution, post-1960s expansion of judicial review, and the enactment of the HRA
made radical changes to this model, in tandem with membership of the EU. Now,
post-Brexit, Boris Johnson’s government is trying to reverse this direction of travel –
and govern in line with the older model, to the best of its ability.
Swimming Against the Tide?
The UK government’s agenda is thus classically ‘conservative’, in the sense that it
is trying to return to an older model of constitutional governance. Support for this
is not restricted to the Conservative Party – it attracts some academic and judicial
support, and positive enthusiasm in the right-wing press. (A cynic might note that
concentration of power in Westminster has historically favoured the political right,
for a variety of factors – not least the UK’s ‘first past the post’ electoral system.) This
revivalist agenda also resonates with the general logic of Brexit, which allows the
former to borrow some of the populist and nationalist energy that drove the latter.
However, the factors that caused the original shift away from this traditional model
remain relevant. Westminster centralisation was unpopular in Scotland and Wales,
and now both have become distinct political spaces: any substantial erosion of
devolution in either place, and in particular Scotland, is likely to provoke a strong
political backlash. Northern Ireland was never successfully governed in line with
this traditional model, and is inevitably going to remain constitutionally distinct. A
more active role for judges in reviewing administrative action and protecting rights
is now well-established: so much so, in fact, that a prominent critic of the expansion
- 3 -
of judicial power under the HRA, the former Supreme Court judge Lord Sumption,
recently ended up advocating judicial strike-down of government Covid regulations to
protect some vague notion of individual liberty. Support for the constitutional reforms
of the last few decades remains strong, in particular among the legal profession,
opposition parties, organised civil society elements, and other key actors in the legal
and political realm. More fundamentally, the ‘faith’ in political constitutionalism (to
quote Paul Scott) and the relatively consensual nature of post-war UK politics which
buoyed up the traditional model during its heyday between 1945-1979 is gone –
and the bitterly divisive post-Brexit political environment offers a poor basis for its
resurrection.
All of which means that the UK government may struggle to achieve the post-Brexit
constitutional ‘rebalancing’ it is seeking, despite its electoral popularity and big
majority in the House of Commons. Instead, its policies may further destabilise an
already fragile constitutional system, without succeeding in resettling it on more
traditional foundations – with Northern Ireland and Scotland, in very different ways,
being the places where such destabilisation might have the most dramatic impact.
Conclusion
Boris Johnson is currently playing an interestingly high-risk game with the UK
constitution. It remains to be seen how far he will succeed in his ambition to revert
to a more traditional mode of UK constitutional governance. There are already signs
that UK government policy may be moderating in some areas – as reflected in the
government’s commitment to remain within the ECHR system, which back in 2014
was openly being questioned within the ranks of the Conservative party. This more
moderate approach may become more prominent over the next few years, especially
if the price of constitutional destabilisation becomes greater than its potential political
gains. However, for now, the UK constitutional system remains in a serious state
of post-Brexit ‘unsettlement’ – with fault-lines like the Scottish independence issue
gaping wider with every passing month.
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